Leituenant Colonel Casper W. Tyler begins his historical account on a report of operations on the morning of May 4, until the morning of the 30which he provided us with four epochs.  Lieut. Col. Tyler has a much more personal perspective on his record, other than relaying field and marching positions. 

The record begins when the one hundred and forty-first regiment which was under the Second Army Corps, Major General Winfield S. Hancock in the First Vermont Calvary, Company M in the Third Division under Major General David B. Birney and the First Brigade under Brigadier General J. H. Ward, leaving camp near Brandy Station, VA on the morning of May 4 (Rhea).    They marched rapidly to the Rapidan crossing at Germanna Ford around 6 a.m.  The regiment then remained at the old Chancellorsville battle-ground until the morning of the 5.  The regiment then marched to Todd’s Tavern where they halted for a four hours and then kept moving.  Lieutenant Colonel Tyler expressed that they drove the enemy “about one-half mile” at Gordonsville Road until they stopped due to the time of night, in which they quickly reformed.  Lieutenant Colonel Tyler mentioned the multiple other regiments, which were in the same brigade, and how they consistently backed each other up and helped them out in more ways than war.  Tyler mentioned the specific lines of battle and at the end of each paragraph he stated their position on men missing or killed in action. 

            May 9 through the 11 “consisted chiefly in marching and countermarching" with the brigade.  The night of the 11, the regiment had been positioned at the foot of Laurel Hill in which they formed two lines.  The one hundred and forty-first were in the second line of the formation.  They began as a whole and moved forward until they surprised and captured the enemy’s works, taking a large number of prisoners.  Lieutenant Colonel Tyler expressed they remained in the “captured works” during the 12 through the 17.  Tyler expressed his personal account in a way that they had “easily repulsed” the enemy’s counter attack and throughout his account makes many assumptions to seem as if it was a Union push-over; however, the battle was ultimately indecisive. 

            Throughout the entire battle, Lieutenant Colonel Tyler is very personal in his record.  Tyler stated the amount of basic supplies they had and the hard times they dealt with other than just on the battle field.  Tyler stated that they have “passed four and five successive days and nights without an hour’s refreshing sleep or rest.”   Tyler seemed to be confused as to their location in many areas in which he states he “regrets that I am unable to particularize our movements with more accuracy during these terrible days.” 

            Through the days of the 21 through the 23 Lieutenant Colonel Tyler stated were mainly days full of marching and countermarching.  Eventually, on the 23 they reached the North Anna River where Tyler ended his report.  At the end of his record, he seems to be extremely loyal and stated that he had the “honor to remain, most respectfully, your obedient servant.”

Captain Cannon’s report on The Battle of the Wilderness, which took place in the wilderness of Spotsylvania County and Orange County in central Virginia, was an electrifying account which contained three epochs from May 3 until the evening of the 26 from the Union Captain.  Captain Cannon explained first that their regiment had broke camp and moved to the extreme left of Brock’s Cross-Roads in order to “protect the flank”.  With this procedure they were able to capture “about 100 prisoners.”  When the enemy had attacked with a strong skirmish line, followed by a heavy column, the left side gave way.  By the end of the 7 they had positioned back to Chancellorsville with the loss of 7 officers and 165 men.    

         On the morning of the 8, a four hour march to Todd’s Tavern had set them up with a position to the right of the Tavern.  Throughout the days between the 8 and the 12, the regiment had mainly been moving and setting up multiple positions back and forth from the Po River.  There they held position where they were allowed coffee for the first time in 36 hours, Captain Cannon stated.  On the 17, the rebels had unsuccessfully assaulted their position.  They then withdrew and massed in the rear of the Landrum house.  Captain Cannon expressed a portion of their regiment to scour the woods for straggling rebels. The scouring of woods was a difficult task due to the terrain of the wilderness.  The total loss up to this point was 8 officers and 88 men.            

Captain Cannon’s record is much more battle tactic descriptive than it is personal.  Cannon wanted whoever to read his account to know their exact locations.  Cannon did not seem worried about his in depth and personal encounters that he and his regiment experienced.  The Captain expressed multiple positions shifts which they made throughout the Wilderness.  He mentioned their dinner on the farm of Colonel Fauntleroy.  Eventually, their loss since leaving Spotsylvania was a total of 18 men. Cannon’s overall report seems to tell us as a soldier that he is an extreme perfectionist and that he wants everything to be detailed, including his report.             

In summary of Captain Cannon’s report, the Captain expressed the multiple positions which played a major role throughout the Battle of the Wilderness which was also a major event in the plan of Robert E. Lee.  Cannon is extremely detailed in his expression of their movements and positions and what they had dealt with in the internal and external hardships throughout the Battle of the Wilderness.

The colonel paused briefly before moving his troops into line to make eye contact with his superior and friend Brig. General Martin Green. Colonel Thomas P. Dockery grew up in a rich railroad dynasty family so he understood the importance the coming battle had to the protection of supply lines, specifically those running through the Mississippi River. Commanding an outstanding infantry of the Second Brigade, the Nineteenth Arkansas and Colonel Dockery commenced fighting on the May 22, 1863 against Grant’s troops who huddled in the ditches right outside the garrison of Fort Hill. The sharpshooters aimed and fired, killing many of the 3,900 Union soldiers that would die that day. Later that week, the 19^th Infantry moved to the rear of the city to fill in the gap created between Major Generals’ Forney and Smith; soon finding that trenches were desperately needed. With their bare hands, the entirety of the infantry from Arkansas set to work, bravely digging all night to fortify their works for themselves and their fellow soldiers. The lack of supplies was unfortunately very common for the good ‘ol Confederate boys at Vicksburg, which severely weakened their morale.

Baldwin’s Ferry Road would be the site of the next bloody encounter with the enemy, and the Confederate army fought back the enemy Union army with mere bites of mule meat in their stomachs. The Infantry was hit time and time again with shells flying from the enemy war ships on the Mississippi River, and Brigadier General Martin Green fell in combat on the 25^th of May, shot directly through the head. The 19^th Infantry, devastated from the loss of their beloved General, looked to Colonel Thomas P. Dockery for leadership, which was a lot of pressure for a young Colonel. The Infantry fought every day through June losing dozens of men in the process, and the ache of war was felt in their bellies and in their hearts.

            The men’s honor was humbled as the word spread like wildfire about the caves, or Prairie Dog Villages, the civilians of the city of Vicksburg were living in. The morale of the men weakened as they realized that they couldn’t protect their own, forcing them to live like animals in the surrounding hillsides.

On July 3^rd, the men still fought for success, and watched gravely as the flag of surrender was raised the next day. The Vicksburg Whig newspaper ran for the last time on wallpaper, highlighting the Union Army’s blockade of the Confederate supply lines into the city, portraying the men walking out of the city as downcast, disheveled prisoners of war. The battle delivered a crippling blow to the morale of the Confederate soldiers and civilians as they survived on swiftly disappearing supplies, their humanity stripped from them in many ways. This was a huge defeat in the political, economic and social aspect as well because it followed a major defeat at Gettysburg, leaving the Confederate nation demoralized. But they fought bravely and held back the Union army for a time in the city of Vicksburg, weakening their forces to the North and protecting vital rail and shipping ports for the sake of their honor. .

The morning officially began at 10:00 AM as the war-weary men of Waul’s Texas Legion lined up shoulder to gray-clad shoulder in Vicksburg, Mississippi; the perfect time for brunch.  But it would forever remain in the minds of the Confederates as the beginning of a fight for their everything-- land, honor, freedom, liberty, property—at the one site most important to hold for any chance of Confederate victory—Vicksburg. The city was strategically placed along the Mississippi River, and until the city and Fort Hill were held by Union colors, the United States army’s supplies would be severely limited upstream.

Waul’s Texas Legion, commanded by Col. Thomas Neville Waul, moved at dawn into position, and as the first shots rang out that morning, their hearts were pumping with the blood of bravery that would lead to a crucial, life-threatening mission later that day. At 10:00AM, Grant’s Union army attacked the city of Vicksburg where the entirety of Lieutenant General Pemberton’s army, including Waul’s Texas Legion, was stationed. Two of Waul’s companies were sent to Fort Hill to re-take the garrison from enemy forces at all costs. Thirty-five men were chosen from the ranks, charging valiantly into direct shell and Minie ball fire for the covert, high-stakes mission of slipping undetected inside the fort as its weak spot. The fort was re-taken amidst smoke, blood, the stench of death and the deafening sound of cannon balls echoing in the near-distance, and Waul’s men earned their colors that day; a small price to pay for the death of nearly 500 comrades. Col. T. N. Waul was a man with a law degree and Congressional experience who ended up as a colonel because of a defeat in the CSA Congress. He resolved from that day forth to never lose again.

Later that day, the men under Col. Wrigley, the commander of the 2^nd battalion of infantry under Waul, discovered a hidden bunch of Union soldiers hiding in a ditch. They found a parapet and fired down upon their enemy, contributing to the Union death toll of nearly 4,000. The day ended with the drums and fifes cheerily hastening the men back to camp following their beloved colors to deeply mourn the loss of nearly every captain who had been with them earlier that morning. Back at camp, the rations were steadily declining, with Captain William Edgar instructing the troops to eat ‘mule meat and fricasseed cat’. The ordinary brunches, shaves, shoe shines and sunrises experienced by the soldiers would be remembered as extraordinary for the simple fact that after the war, every ordinary task would be a painful reminder of all the ordinary they experiences with their fallen comrades. The next brunch they ate could be their last.

The battle of Vicksburg ended on July 4, 1863 in a Confederate surrender, but the beginning of the forty-seven day battle delivered a great blow to the Union army, Grant soon realizing he couldn’t take the city the way he planned because the Confederates were simply too strong. Vicksburg drew Union soldiers away from Gettysburg, and it showcased the desperate need of the good ‘ol Confederate boys to preserve their way of life at all costs.

According to the official chronology of skirmishes in the ongoing Battle of Petersburg, the time frame between the first major battle in June of 1864 and up to the final showdown in April of 1865 might appear relatively quiet.  It had been three years since a large number of these men had been recruited, and their term of service was soon to end – leaving many of them hoping to quietly finish out their time.  But according to Colonel James R. Hagood, commander of the First South Carolina Infantry, skirmishes continued even during “quiet” times and often proved deadly.

Historian A. Wilson Greene points out that Grant’s next strategy, following the Union’s mass casualties at the Battle of the Crater, was to target the transportation routes into Petersburg, cutting off the critical supply line of Weldon Railroad and exploiting the “weakened and divided Army of Northern Virginia” in August of 1864.  Hagood’s regiment arrived in Petersburg on August 23, and kept themselves busy “throwing up field-works in its vicinity” until September 28, when Grant went on the offensive once again and ordered Union forces to attack Fort Harrison – also known as “Battery Harrison.”

The strongest fort on the Richmond-Petersburg line, Fort Harrison was overtaken by Union troops on September 29, in spite of a “personally organized” campaign by Lee to regain Confederate control of the fort.  According to Hagood’s report in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Confederate forces made preparations on September 30 to regain Fort Harrison.  Historian Richard J. Sommers writes that Lee’s foot soldiers were his only hope in recapturing the fort, and a plan to converge regiments from Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina was put into play.

As another regiment ran toward the confrontation, Hagood noted that this was a waste of energy that could have been saved for the more important “struggle on the parapet.”  He wanted the record to show he was not in agreement with this decision, but “believing it to be an order, [he] acquiesced.”  What Hagood did not realize at the time was that Confederate commander “Tige” Anderson had failed to explain the plan to his men, and once the Georgia regiment charged forward, it was too late for the South Carolinians to get into position.  “Timing and tactical skill” were crucial to the success of this plan, reportedly devised by Lee, and one without the other resulted in chaos.

The Union forces opened fire, and, according to Hagood, what followed was mass confusion – as one brigade “gave way, and rushing through our line caused immediate confusion.”  Many of Hagood’s brigade had already abandoned the battle, leaving only a few men who remained with him as he moved within 60 yards of the fort.  After waiting 10 to 15 minutes for reinforcements that never arrived, Hagood decided his only remaining choice was to “fall back.”  Frank Mixson, a private in Company E of Hagood’s 1st South Carolina Volunteers, stated that Hagood returned to the open field to retrieve his regiment’s colors from the clenched hand of a dead fellow soldier, making such an impression on the Yankees that they did not fire on him “while he was doing this gallant deed.”  Hagood later received orders to “advance again on the enemy,” but upon executing the command, he found there was no enemy.  On October 7, however, Hagood’s regiment made a daybreak attack on Union forces “on the Darbytown Pass and drove [them] from the line of works.”

Hagood’s report revealed that he was often frustrated by what he perceived as lack of rational explanation for decisions sent down to his brigade.  On the October 7 charge, his orders were to move on the enemy’s artillery, which he did.  But after a “long delay, which has never been explained” to him, Hagood and his men re-engaged Federal troops, who by now had reinforcements and were able to fight back.  Hagood’s men eventually withdrew, losing all the ground they had gained that morning, but on November 27 they drove back Federal troops on Williamsburg Road and captured “30 or 40” as prisoners.  On December 9, Hagood moved his men down Darbytown Road to the enemy’s position, and “after considerable maneuvering (for which purpose and with what effect I [Hagood] have been unable to learn),” the brigade “withdrew in the night and returned to camp.”  Again, Hagood’s tone was one of frustration over what he believed was poor planning and use of time and resources – but being an “obedient servant,” he followed his orders.

The Union army later changed the fort’s name to Fort Burnham, after Union Brigadier General Hiram Burnham of the Sixth Maine Infantry who was killed in the attack at Chaffin’s Farm, near Richmond, on September 29.  The battle at Fort Harrison resulted in 37 deaths, 209 injured, and 19 captured or missing Confederate soldiers – nearly half of Hagood’s regiment.  Compared to major battles such as Gettysburg or Vicksburg, the fight for control of Fort Harrison seems somewhat insignificant.  But in the lives of Colonel James R. Hagood and his 572 men, it was not only significant – it was a matter of life and death, and a story that deserved to be recorded.

In his report dated December 16, 1864, Chaplain Lorenzo Barber’s brigade had just finished what he called the destruction of “one of the most important railroads in the so-called Confederacy.”  But even with his reputation as “one of the best shots in the army” and the nickname of “The Fighting Parson,” Barber revealed the inner struggle he felt as a minister and a soldier when he shared his conflicting emotions over the events he witnessed.

As a marksman, Barber was originally recruited by the elite 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters. In response to the belief by some "concerned Northerners" that the South was superior in its infantry and cavalry, an article was published in the May 30, 1861 New York Times to recruit skilled marksmen.  It read, “No application will be considered in which the average of ten consecutive shots exceeds five inches from the centre of target to the centre of the ball at two hundred yards” - only the best should apply.  And so the 1st and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters were born.

Known as Berdan’s Sharpshooters after their organizer, Col. Hiram Berdan, these men brought new weapons and a new way of doing battle to the military, replacing the rifled musket with a more accurate target rifle.  An unfortunate byproduct of this accuracy meant that sharpshooters also became targets for the enemy – and Barber became one of the statistics.  In the Battle of Chancellorsville, he suffered a severe leg wound in the midst of musket fire during the Mine Run attack on November 30, 1863.  According to author Gerald Earley, “Barber’s career as a chaplain/sniper, and one of the best shots in the army, was finished.”  Charles Augustus Stevens wrote that after Barber's injury, he "never failed to have a large audience when he officiated as preacher.  As the boys expressed it: 'That chaplain practices what he preaches.  He tells us what we should do, and goes with us to the very front to help us in battle.'"

Barber’s injuries did not prevent him from continued service with the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters.  In his December 16, 1864 report to Brevet Major General Mott, commanding officer of the 3rd Division, 2nd Corps, Barber recounted events concerning the December 9 destruction of the Weldon Railroad.  By this time, the siege of Petersburg was in its latter stages.  The Battle of the Crater four months earlier had resulted in major casualties for the Union army, and, according to historian A. Wilson Greene, was instrumental in Grant's decision to target transportation routes.  On August 18 and 21, Union forces struck the Petersburg Railroad (also known as Weldon Railroad, which ran south from Richmond to Weldon, N.C.) and emerged victorious.  It is not clear why Barber's regiment received orders in December to destroy additional portions of the Weldon Railroad, because, according to historian James McPherson, Southern railroads were already inferior to those in the North, primarily because there were no uniform standards of operation.

But on December 7, 1864, the 5th and 2nd Corps of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Division were called to finish off the railroad's destruction.  Describing in detail the performance of his brigade, Barber explained how they lifted up the rails “as if by magic” to remove the ties so they could be burned, creating heat so great that it caused the rails to curl.  Then, in the next breath, he criticized the lack of compassion by the brigade commanders, saying they “facetiously called the portion of road assigned them to destroy ‘their contract.’”  Commenting further on the aftermath of the railroad destruction, Barber summed up his feelings, and those who go to war: “The sight presented by the burning road, bridges, piles of wood, and fences, was sad and grand in the extreme – a terrible comment on the waste and ravages of war.”

As Barber’s division received word from Major General Warren that they had successfully accomplished their mission and could return to camp at daylight, they were joined by groups of “colored people,” likely freed slaves looking for food and shelter.  It is hard to say what kind of effect this had on Barber’s division, since he did not address that in his report.  But as historian Chandra Manning documents, there was often a strange co-existence of anti-slavery and anti-black sentiment among the Union army regarding the “place” of blacks in society.

The journey back to camp brought a renewed sense of revenge along with it as well, as Barber told of finding several of his men “murdered, stripped and mutilated by guerrillas,” and of seeing several nearby buildings that were burning.  As the march continued, so did evidence of the enemy’s carnage – and as a result, most of the buildings along the remaining miles of the march were burned in retaliation by the Union troops.

Barber joined the Union army as a skilled marksman, only to leave as a wounded colonel who had witnessed enough suffering from “this cruel war” to bring out the best and the worst in his own life.  In the minds of historians, the final destruction of the Weldon Railroad would not compare to other battles in the Eastern Theater, at least not statistically.  But to Chaplain Lorenzo Barber, the “Fighting Parson,” this victory “in the frost and snow of winter and in the very face of the most powerful army of the rebellion” was worthy of recognition – for the individual men who attained it, and for the Union they were fighting to preserve.

Hindered by an uneven terrain covered with “tangled thickets of pine, scrub-oak, and cedar,” battle organization and tactics broke down as Captain Robert H. Milliken and other officers struggled to see the enemy and maintain unit cohesion. Consequently, the Battle of the Wilderness represented a definitive moment in the course of the Civil War - providing  an insightful perspective to a polysemic conflict.  Lasting officially from May 5 to May 7, 1864, the conflict marked the first engagement in a larger Federal campaign to wear down Confederate tactical strength and capture Richmond.  Moreover, though, it was the first time that the commands of General Ulysses S. Grant and General Robert E. Lee would meet in battle – a scenario that would come to dominate the remainder of the war and has defined historical perceptions.

Serving in the 69th New York Infantry, a famed Irish regiment that solidified ethnic Irish and Catholic support for the Union, Captain Robert H. Milliken provides a first hand account of the three day battle – characterizing the large numbers of killed and wounded, difficult terrain, and inconclusive action.  From the first epoch of his terse battlefield report, Milliken describes the movement of his company from the former Chancellorsville battlefield, across the Rapidian River, and into a heavy engagement with Rebel forces.  Composing the far left section of the Federal lines, his troops along with the remaining detachments of the First Division are depicted as becoming “heavily engaged” in a battle that “raged with great severity and obstinacy."

Despite encountering initial success, though, advances from Rebel troops under General Longstreet eventually overran the Federal regiments; consequently, the 69th Infantry with the rest of the Second Irish Brigade was removed from direct combat and ordered to Todd’s Tavern where they remained until May 9, 1864.  Engagements fettered out by May 7, 1864, as the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia counter-maneuvered and repositioned forces for what would become a continued set of encounters in central Virginia.  Still, the impact on the "Fightin 69th" was profound - after four years of continued combat the brigade had been reduced to regimental size and was forced to assimilate into other units.

Nevertheless, severe casualties and difficult battle circumstances failed to provide a tactical advantage for either army.  Thus, the limited engagements described by Milliken demonstrate the effects of combat experience on the enlisted mindset while providing a first hand chronology of the Wilderness.

With a stylistic flavor characteristic of elevated Romantic ideals combined with ornate “battle-piece” rhetoric, Captain Nelson Penfield of the 125th New York Infantry provides historians with a field account of Federal engagements at the Battle of the Wilderness.  His report begins on May 3, 1864, crossing the Rapidan River at Ely’s Ford along with the other units under the command of Brigadier-General Francis Barlow of the First Division and Major General Winfield Hancock of the Second Corps.  Placed as part of the Third Brigade under Colonel Paul Frank, Penfield’s troops formed the far left section of the Federal lines – holding an exposed position partially across the Brock and Plank Roads.

It was May 6, 1864, before Penfield’s men encountered heavy fire, though, as they acted on orders to attack the Confederate southern flank composed of General Hill’s troops.  His description provides a graphic scene of battle, commenting on “sounding in the woods like the wailing of a tempest," in which the vegetation prevented cohesive movements and concealed the enemy.  Shortly after engaging the Rebels, the units under Colonel Frank began to run out of ammunition - forcing a withdrawal under heavy pressure from Lieutenant Colonel Sorrel’s advance along an unfinished railroad.  The 125th was pushed further back by fire, which consumed earthworks and trapped many wounded soldiers.

Consequently, the inability to sustain an offensive forced a retreat and opened Webb to counterattacks from Longstreet’s men.  Disorganization ensued as combat fatigue – caused by hours of combat in dense forest under “heavy murderous fire” – combined with heavy casualties.  Reinforcing the actions bloody consequences, direct references are made in Penfield’s report as he comments on the losses of “some of the best men and most faithful soldiers in the regiment."

Despite the high losses, though, the engagements depicted by Penfield became the foundations for an ongoing offensive planned by General Ulysses S. Grant.  Rather than withdrawing north past the Rapidian and Rappahannock Rivers after major actions in the Wilderness subsided, the Army of the Potomac continued to march south.  Nonetheless, the battlefield account of Colonel Nelsen Penfield provides a greater understanding of front line experiences that shaped future engagements along the Po River, the “Bloody Angle,” and the Battle of Spotsylvania.

The experiences during the first day of combat at Shiloh were a display of a new level of brutality encountered in American warfare, with no unit better exhibiting this change than the Nineteenth Louisiana Regiment. A regiment of the First Brigade under Colonel Gibson in the Army of the Mississippi and led by Colonel B.L. Hodge, the Nineteenth Louisiana entered combat on the Sunday of April 6, 1862 during the Confederate assault on the Union army on the banks of the Tennessee River, near the port of Pittsburgh Landing, Tennessee. Mustered from Louisiana communities the previous December, the recruits of the Nineteenth Louisiana experienced their first taste of war during their attack on the Union positions surrounding Barnes field, now considered part of the infamous “Hornet’s Nest.”

The Nineteenth, along with the rest of the First Brigade, began their attack at noon on the sixth of April, when they launched four consecutive waves at the well-entrenched Union positions of Tuttle and Prentiss. Hodge, the commanding officer of the Nineteenth, recalled the “impenetrable undergrowth” in front of the Union lines that left both sides “only firing at the flash of the enemy’s pieces.” After seeing the futility of firing at indistinguishable targets, Hodge ordered a bayonet charge, a command his men promptly obeyed. However, after advancing a mere “20 or 30 steps” the undergrowth of the terrain again forced the Nineteenth to halt the attack and due to the cross-fire from Union forces inflicting heavy casualties on his men, Hodge ordered his unit to fall back, “which was accordingly done in good order.” After the initial advance, Hodge and his men were ordered three more times to assault the same, undergrowth-ridden position, where they lost increasingly more men in each wave. Throughout his report, Hodge repeatedly praised the efforts of his men, commending their “desperate courage and unflinching bravery,” while simultaneously offering alternate tactical plans of how to overwhelm the enemy, contrasting the repeated frontal assaults ordered by his superiors. Hodge, commanding in his first major engagement, seemed intent on sharing his contrasting view of the tactics he was forced to implement, a desire that showed not only his ability to follow orders as a first time commander, but also the potential for future promotion through his ingenuity.

Following their actions on April 6, the Nineteenth Louisiana spent the majority of April 7 covering the retreat of the Washington artillery from the field.  Comprised primarily of new recruits who had seen little to no combat action, the Nineteenth Louisiana Regiment discovered the bloody and seemingly unnecessary effects of repeated attacks against a well entrenched foe at Shiloh, foreshadowing the deadly outcomes of future engagements.

Similar to the soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi, the recruits of the Sixth Iowa Regiment in Grant’s Army of the Tennessee found warfare during the battle of Shiloh to be far more intense than any of their previous combat experiences. Mustered on July 17, 1861, the Sixth Iowa Infantry Regiment participated in the expeditions to Springfield and Crump’s Landing along the Tennessee River prior to their action at Shiloh.

Their encounters during the violence at Pittsburgh Landing reflected the experiences of the average infantryman and the challenges faced by inexperienced soldiers. Following the Confederate assault on Grant’s center on the morning of April 6, 1862, the Sixth Iowa was immediately sent to the line of battle in an effort to protect the bridge over Owl Creek, where the Confederate attack was gradually moving toward the right. Fearful of being outflanked by enemy units and cut off from the rest of the army, Captain Williams relocated the unit to an alternate position. At this time, Confederate General Trabue’s brigade launched a fierce attack on the Union center, an attack that the Sixth Iowa, along with the Forty Sixth Ohio and the Thirteenth Missouri, withstood for an hour and a half. According to Trabue, “the combat here was a severe one…I lost here many men and several officers.” Trabue’s report of stiff resistance from the Union soldiers coincided with Captain Williams claim that “the regiment gallantly maintained the position” before eventually pulling back in the face of overwhelming odds. Williams repeatedly praised the actions of his men, declaring that “too much cannot be said” with regards to the “bravery, coolness, and intrepidity of both officers and men.” While the Sixth Iowa repelled Confederate attacks for over an hour, the casualties suffered by the unit (54) paled in comparison to the losses suffered by the Forty Sixth Ohio (246) and the 40^th Illinois (216), two Union units that withstood the same advance from Trabue’s brigade. As soldiers in their first major engagement, the attack by Trabue's regiment on William's men mostly likely defined the remainder of their initial wartime experience.

Shiloh, unlike the previous expeditions undertaken by the Sixth Iowa, proved to be far more costly in terms of lives and battle fatigue. Wounded shortly after retreating from the Trabue brigade attack, Williams was wounded from a throw off his horse, causing him to leave the battle. His absence, however, did not keep him from reporting the brave actions of his men, implying the possibility of Williams’ potential for hyperbole in his reports. Shortly after Shiloh, Williams was promoted to Full Major, an indication of his worth as a field officer and strong constitution in the face of fierce action. While the fighting at Shiloh took a larger toll on adjacent units, the Sixth Iowa still found the fighting worthy of placing greater emphasis on the tenacity and bravery of its own soldiers, even considering its non engagement status the following day.